Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry by Epstein, Richard A. & Brown, Thomas P.
Cyhersecurity in the Payment Card Indnstry
Richard A. Epsteint & Thomas P Browntt
I. THE TWO-TIER LOGIC OF THEFT PREVENTION
The payment card industry has of late received an enormous level
of critical academic scrutiny. The two issues that have dominated the
literature are antitrust and consumer protection. The former deals
with the various ways in which credit card companies structure them-
selves and their possible exposure to charges of monopolization. The
latter deals with various forms of legislation that ask whether, and if
so how, state regulation should mandate disclosure on the one hand
and limit the substantive terms of consumer contracts on the other.
From our classical liberal perspective, we think that these two jump-
ing-off points are odd places to begin the inquiry, given the high level
of competition that exists everywhere in the credit card industry, both
from established players and from new entrants.' Using a payment
card (as opposed to some other form of payment) rests on voluntary
decisions by consumers and merchants, as well as the banks with
which they interact. Although it is theoretically possible to imagine
government intervention improving on the outcome that these multi-
ple parties are able to achieve through contract, in practice, a litany of
political pressures and regulatory glitches make it highly unlikely that
those results could be achieved.
This hands-off conclusion does not apply to another issue that has
plagued private payment systems since their emergence a half-century
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ago-fraud and, closely related, identity theft.2 As issues go, fraud is
generally an unpopular topic for academics and regulators. Virtually
everyone agrees that innocent transactors should be protected against
the fraudulent actions of third parties. But at that point the conversa-
tion generally ceases, without undertaking the hard work to find what
contractual and institutional arrangements work best to combat the
fraud that everyone deplores. If fraud is bad, then what mix of public
and private systems should be used to implement a coherent policy of
fraud prevention in modern payment transactions, all of which involve
the extensive creation, transmission, storage, and use of information,
both financial and personal, involving huge numbers of individuals?3
The logistical problems that are raised by dealing with the mas-
sive and continuous flow of transactions should, we think, be virtually
self-evident. But the basic risks to these voluntary transactions are as
old as commerce itself. Even the earliest legal sources take for granted
the corrosive effect of fraud and theft in their efforts to combat it. We
briefly review the evolution of the law of theft, the punishment of
which remains a proper government function, in order to set the stage
for dealing with the contractual and regulatory issues that remain.
II. QUICK TOUR OF THE LAW OF THEFT
Much of the modern law on cybersecurity is shaped by the earlier
law on theft and related offenses. The Roman law of flurtum, for ex-
ample, defined the notion of theft very broadly, so as to include not
only the removal of chattels from the possession of their owner, but
also any knowingly unauthorized use of a thing by a bailee or other
servant who took possession from the owner.' The penalties for theft
were harsh, calling initially for death.' The Roman law of theft did not
only address the behavior of the thief. It also brought within the scope
of the wrong those individuals who received the stolen property with
2 We thus largely exclude from this discussion other important dangers that include denial
of service attacks, viruses, and loss of state secrets.
3 For a discussion of currently accepted models for addressing data leaks, see Paul M.
Schwartz and Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 Mich L Rev 913, 932-45
(2007) (arguing that current models are insufficient and advocating for the creation of a
coordinated response architecture as well as a critical organization monitoring credit security
performance).
4 For the relevant materials, see Gaius, The Institutes of Gaius, bk III, §§ 195-97 at 219
(Clarendon 1946) (Francis de Zulueta, ed). For a general discussion, see Barry Nicholas, An
Introduction to Roman Law 211-15 (Clarendon 1962) (lamenting the complexities of the Roman
law of theft, detailing the offense's particular history, and explaining the distinctions between
different theft offenses).
5 Gaius, The Institutes of Gaius bk III, § 189 at 215-16 (cited in note 4) (stating that the
penalty for theft was capital and required enslavement to the person from whom the thief had
stolen or, if the thief was a slave, death).
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knowledge of the theft.! The obvious point for this regime was to
shrink the incentive for theft by reducing the prospects of sale in a
secondary market. That in turn reduces the gains from theft when the
value in exchange is greater than it is in use, which is typically the case
for stolen property.
For its part, the early English law of theft tied the offense not to
the wrongful misappropriation of a particular chattel, but to the taking
of the chattel from the possession of the owner with an intention per-
manently to deprive him of its possession.' That definition proved less
durable than the earlier Roman definition, so that additional of-
fenses-larceny by trick, larceny by bailee, taking by false pretenses,
and embezzlement-had to be grafted onto this paradigm case to
close the gap.8 In more modern times, as information became more
important, theft was no longer applied exclusively to tangible chattels.
Definitions in the Model Penal Code, for example, have been ex-
panded to make theft statutes cover various forms of intangible prop-
erty,9 including of course the databases that are everywhere today pro-
tected as a form of trade secret, which themselves are now subject to
stringent forms of federal legislation that call for criminal penalties,
including fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture.' The federal statute also
extends its prohibitions to anyone who "receives, buys, or possesses"
such information."
The persistent expansion of the modern law of theft represents, of
course, an effort to stop antisocial behavior by the use of criminal
sanctions against the wrongdoer or wrongdoers involved first in taking
and thereafter in dealing with stolen goods or information. Yet at the
same time, public force has never been the only weapon used to coun-
teract theft. A second task, of equal importance, is the allocation of
the risk of loss among innocent parties who have suffered losses from
6 Id bk III, §§ 186-87 at 214 (distinguishing between furtum conceptum, where a stolen
thing has been sought and found on a man's premises in the presence of a witness, and furtum
oblatum, where a stolen thing has been passed off by someone and has been found on a man's
premises rather than his own).
7 For an exposition of the evolution of larceny away from its roots in trespass, see
generally George P Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 Harv L Rev 469 (1976) (arguing
that the transformation from the common law has expanded the range of circumstances that can
provoke intrusive prosecutorial scrutiny).
8 For the variations, see Model Penal Code § 223.1(1) (ALl 1962) (calling for the
consolidation of theft offenses).
9 Id § 223.0(6) (defining property as anything of value).
10 See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-294, 110 Stat 3488, codified as
amended at 18 USC §§ 1831-39 (2000 & Supp 2002) (broadly covering the conversion of trade
secrets "related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign
commerce," which covers just about every commercial secret). For an explanation of fines and
imprisonment, see id § 1832(a). For criminal forfeiture, see id § 1834.
11 Id § 1832(a)(3).
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various forms of theft. The usual rule starts with the simple proposi-
tion that in the first instance, the loss from theft falls directly on the
owner of the property, who then has a set of strong private incentives
to guard against that theft. The level of private precautions will of
course reflect the effectiveness of the public law in preventing theft,
such that in the extreme no one would so much as lock his gates if the
public sanctions against theft were perfect. But it becomes evident
that when these sanctions fall short, private individuals will take pre-
cautions that start with doors and progress to elaborate security sys-
tems designed to guard against theft. At this point all actors engage in
a delicate coordination game: if public authorities reduce or redirect
their level of protection, private individuals will undertake additional
steps for self-protection. It is therefore difficult in the abstract to
judge either the relative or combined effectiveness of the two systems
in preventing loss. The plot thickens when, as is common in many
cases, the property stolen is subject to the divided control of two or
more individuals, as when a chattel is stolen from a party to whom it
has been lent. The problem of divided control, moreover, is far more
critical with information than it is with tangible objects, for the simple
reason that the same information is routinely shared by large numbers
of individuals in ordinary cases, as is necessarily the case with routine
credit information.
In these cases, it is critical to determine how to divide the risk of
loss between the multiple parties. In the early Roman and English
systems, the allocation was often determined by an explicit rule that
depended both on the nature of the divided ownership and the actual
source of the loss.'2 In transactions for the benefit of the bailee, the
risk of loss was presumptively placed on him. But when the transac-
tion was for the benefit of the bailor (as in bailments for deposit), the
risk of loss would normally lie on the owner of the property. The
analysis was further complicated depending on the source of the loss.
A bailee who was required to take precautions against simple theft
might not be required to take them against robbery. In more compli-
cated situations, especially those involving three or more parties, the
allocation of loss between the parties could be determined by con-
tract, which could override the presumptive allocation of loss set by
any default rule. These contracts did not emerge in early times, and for
two reasons. The default rules usually offered an accurate assignment
of the risk of loss in routine transactions, and the size of the transac-
12 For the Roman rules, see Gaius, The Institutes of Gaius bk 111, §§ 203-08 at 221-22 (cited
in note 4) (explaining that a theft action is available to those who have an interest in the safety of
the thing stolen, including collateral interests).
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tion was not large enough to warrant any private revision of the initial
loss provisions. But in all settings, the debates were only instrumental,
and never moral: the object of choosing the right rules for risk alloca-
tion was to minimize the net costs of theft, as measured by the losses
from the theft, less the costs of prevention, including the costs of run-
ning the system. In principle, the usual marginal conditions should
hold, such that the last dollar spent on theft prevention should reduce
the losses from stolen property by one dollar-a standard that is hard
to implement in practice, when there are so many moving margins at
any one time.
III. THE TWO TIERS IN PAYMENT CARD MARKETS
We think that this basic two-part program carries over without
missing a beat to the various financial losses that are associated with
payment card transactions. Payment card transactions involve the co-
ordination of activity across many different parties. A "simple" trans-
action frequently involves five parties-the cardholder, the merchant,
the cardholder's bank, the merchant's bank, and a network connecting
the two financial institutions. When a cardholder swipes a card at a
merchant through an electronic terminal, the terminal captures the
information on the back of the card, adds information about the
transaction and relays the information to the network associated with
the card. The network performs a screen (for example, confirming that
the card is genuine) and, assuming the transaction passes that test,
asks the cardholder's bank to authorize the purchase. The cardholder's
bank checks to see whether the cardholder has sufficient funds in the
account to cover the purchase. If the cardholder has funds available to
cover the purchase, the cardholder's bank generally approves the
transaction and relays the approval back up the chain to the mer-
chant.'3 The entire process takes a couple of seconds." Each link in the
approval process relies on information that originates with the card
presented by the cardholder, making the cards and the information
they contain inherently valuable.
13 The text describes a typical Visa or MasterCard card transaction. See David S. Evans
and Richard Schmalensee, Playing with Plastic: The Digital Revolution in Buying and Borrowing
9-10 (MIT 2d ed 2005). American Express and Discover transactions omit a couple of steps in
the approval process by dealing directly with merchants and cardholders.
14 Over the last thirty years, a highly specialized payment business in the United States has
developed, which relies on third-party data processors to help banks on both the cardholder and
merchant sides. The increase in the number of parties to a transaction to seven decreases the
total processing time. See id at 247-51 (discussing the evolution of payment processing and
identifying the different entities involved in a payment card transaction).
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There is little doubt today that extensive criminal sanctions are
properly imposed on those who steal valuable payment card informa-
tion. But prosecution is not an easy job. The thefts, as we shall see, are
often made surreptitiously and at a distance. Their clever execution
makes prosecution of the thieves, many of whom operate across the
globe, a difficult matter requiring the coordination of law enforcement
officials from many nations. The thieves, moreover, always work dili-
gently to keep the fact of the theft hidden from the person from whom
the data was stolen in order to prolong the use of the stolen informa-
tion. Once the fact of the theft becomes known to the person from
whom the data was stolen, public disclosure is simply a matter of time,
and at that point, the stolen data lose most, if not all, of their value to
the thief. No one doubts that investigating and prosecuting thieves of
payment card information is worth undertaking; how these investiga-
tions should be done, or the various criminal sanctions imposed lie,
however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead, this paper addresses the second strategy of loss preven-
tion: the private arrangements among the various persons against
whom the theft has been perpetuated. Initially, it should be clear that
the optimal structure of loss prevention in this area is far more com-
plex than it is with the traditional theft of chattels, or indeed, even
with various kinds of trade secrets, for the reasons noted above. The
simple point here is that the process of entrustment with information
is not what it is for chattels. A chattel can be given to one person for
safekeeping, so that the owner can use personal knowledge to limit
loss. But that option is not available with information that has to flow
through multiple hands to be valuable. Universally, stolen payment
card information is worthless to the thief unless it can be used to gen-
erate a transaction. In order to be used, however, the data must pass
through each of the links in the payment card chain: the merchant
through whom the thief tries to use the stolen data to generate a new
transaction; the merchant's acquiring bank; the card network; the issu-
ing bank; and, ultimately, the cardholder.
At least potentially, each link in the chain has an interest in
blocking the attempted fraud. Depending on how the information
associated with the payment card was obtained by the thief, some
links may be better able to distinguish attempted fraud from a legiti-
mate transaction. For example, did the consumer lose this card? Was
the consumer's wallet stolen? Did the Russian mafia obtain the in-
formation encoded on the magnetic stripe on the back of this card by
penetrating the system?"1 The structure of the typical credit card trans-
15 For a discussion of the role of Russian mafia, see text accompanying notes 41-42.
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action relies on a constant use of shared information, which means
that it is highly unlikely that any one person or institution qualifies as
the cheapest cost avoider. Accordingly, any rational approach to loss
prevention requires the coordination of multiple actors up and down
the chain of credit card use. And someone has to define the responsi-
bilities for each link in the chain and decide what each link needs to
know.
Our central thesis-which, except for recent developments, we
would have thought beyond reproach-is that voluntary contracts
offer by far the best way to allocate the risks of loss, and the duties of
prevention, among the various parties within this elaborate network.
For payment card information, the costs of keeping information se-
cure and the benefits that flow from better security fall on the partici-
pants in the system. No public body outside the system is likely to have
the information and ability to design a strategy for loss prevention that
outperforms one that private parties can devise for themselves.
16
We are under no illusion that this system will be perfect. Javelin
Strategy and Research began reporting statistics on identity theft-
broadly defined to include fraudulent use of information associated
with existing payment cards-in 2003 with a report commissioned by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)." Javelin estimated that total
fraud in 2006 from identity theft was $49.3 billion. 8 This astounding
number actually represents a decline from previous levels. Javelin es-
timated that total fraud resulting from identity theft was $53.8 billion
in 2003." Although Javelin's definition of fraud may overstate the ac-
tual losses from fraud, other sources confirm that the actual costs of
fraud are significant, even under more restrictive metrics. According
to the FTC, consumers reported credit card fraud losses of $1.2 billion
in 2006, up significantly from 2005.20 Financial institutions report fraud
16 For a similar view about cybersecurity issues more generally, see Robert W. Hahn and
Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software Security, 30 Harv J L & Pub Policy 283,
286 (2006) (noting that the cure is often worse than the disease). For a somewhat different take,
see Schwartz and Janger, 105 Mich L Rev at 960-70 (cited in note 3) (suggesting the need for a
"coordinated response agent" to deal with information security concerns).
17 For the latest version, see generally Mary T. Monahan, 2007 Identity Fraud Survey
Report: Identity Fraud Is Dropping, Continued Vigilance Necessary ("2007 Javelin Survey")
(Javelin Strategy & Research, Feb 2007).
18 Id at 1.
19 Id.
20 Total Number of Fraud Complaints & Amount Paid: Calendar Years 2004 through 2006,
ConsumerSentinel (Feb 7, 2007), online at http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/Sentinel CY_2006/
totaLfraudcomplaints-amountpaid.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008). For discussion, see also Joseph
Pereira, Bill Would Punish Retailers for Leaks of Personal Data, Wall St J B1 (Feb 22, 2007)
(reporting on a proposed Massachusetts statute that would require retailers to pay for losses
when hackers and thieves breach their security systems).
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losses of a similar amount. Issuer fraud losses on the Visa system, for
example, have hovered around six basis points of volume (0.06 per-
cent) for several years.2' With volume in 2006 of approximately $1.75
trillion, this amounts to an additional $1 billion." The other major
payment card systems report similar amounts of fraud losses. Of
course, these figures do not reflect the costs of countermeasures." But
even if the cost of fraud is the "modest" $3 billion, it amounts to a real
tax on commerce with no offsetting benefits. Javelin's astounding
$49.3 billion only raises the stakes.
It seems clear, moreover, that the costs of fraud and fraud pre-
vention are closely related, for any increase in the level of fraudulent
activity will quickly transform itself into an increase in the efforts at
loss prevention. But that generality conceals a host of other issues, for
it does not indicate exactly what duties should be parceled out to
whom, or what sanctions should be imposed for their nonperformance.
It is on these questions of system design and marginal deterrence that
we find that the greatest gains come from private ordering.
IV. A MANY-SIDED TRADEOFF
Part of the difficulty in setting the relevant priorities is that the
question of fraud prevention cannot be decided in a vacuum. In deal-
ing with payment card risks, it turns out that everyone wants two
competing items that they cannot have in an unalloyed form: conven-
ience and security.
The desire for the first of these is evident. We all want payment
card transactions to be fast and easy. Speed matters, even when it is
measured in terms of seconds. Credit card transactions are not rela-
tionship transactions that depend on some element of personal trust.
Rather, these are the quintessential impersonal transactions in which
all that is desired is prompt and flawless execution-swipe the card,
approve the transaction amount, wait for authorization, sign the re-
ceipt, go. The more rapid speed makes it possible to use credit cards
for transactions in ever smaller dollar amounts. There is, for example, a
real effort to reduce the need for signed receipts by using simple
swipe transactions. Right now many merchants dispense with signa-
21 See, for example, Visa USA, Inc, Quarterly Performance Data Fourth Quarter 2006,
online at httpl/www.usa.visa.condownload/about-visa/press-resources/statistics/Q42006.pdf (visited
Oct 2,2007).
22 See id (providing data on total volume for 2006 and the percentage of net fraud).
23 In 2005, for example, Visa estimated that it was planning to increase spending to combat
fraud by $200 million over the following four years Visa USA, Inc, Visa USA Annual Report 2005
1-2, online at http://usa.visa.com/download/about visa/annual report.pdf (visited Oct 2, 2007)
(discussing challenges from and responses to fraud for Visa).
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tures for purchases under $25 in order to keep the lines moving.2 That
premium on speed also opens new markets for credit cards. One in-
stance is their use in parking meters, where the amount of money in-
volved is often under one dollar. Advantages accrue to the consumer,
including the ability to choose the exact amount of time to park and
the ability to execute a transaction when there is no change jingling in
the pocket. For the municipal authority, the use of cards allows for
faster collection of funds, and, as a bonus, it eliminates the risk that
thieves will break into parking meters.
The desire for convenience necessarily conflicts with the desire
for security. Transactions would be more secure if consumers were
required to use a form of two-factor authentication to initiate every
transaction. But adding a step to a payment card transaction is a bit like
putting a pebble in the shoe of a marathon runner; the user winces with
every step. Convenience, of course, goes beyond speed. Since mail and
telephone order merchants first began accepting payment cards in
1970s, card-not-present transactions have generated a disproportionate
amount of fraud. Payment card systems could reduce fraud simply by
forbidding people from using them on the internet, over the phone, or
through the mail. Doing so, however, would rob payment cards of much
of their utility for consumers as well as merchants.
Further complicating matters is the desire for anonymity or, as it
is more often described, privacy. We have all engaged in transactions
that we want to keep concealed, in whole or part, from some other
interested or potentially interested party, as is often the case with por-
nography and gambling-where billing information often goes out
under innocuous descriptions. But anonymity presents a real problem
for many transactions, including all payment card transactions. Al-
though a typical payment card transaction may appear to be a simul-
taneous exchange, it is not. The consumer leaves the store with mer-
chandise, but the merchant merely receives in exchange a promise of
payment that must be processed through several layers of intermedi-
aries. In a typical face-to-face transaction, if the merchant has fol-
lowed the necessary steps, this promise to pay will be supported by a
guarantee backed first by the merchant's bank, then by the card-
holder's bank, and ultimately by the system itself. Even with a guaran-
tee, however, a promise to pay is not the same as being paid, and there
24 Visa dispensed with the signature authorization requirement to expand acceptance of its
cards at quick service restaurants such as McDonald's and Taco Bell. Typically, quick service
restaurants needed to capture signatures at the point of sale in order to avoid liability for
fraudulent transactions; a major disadvantage for payment cards relative to cash. Two years ago,
however, Visa persuaded issuers to eliminate the requirement and to accept liability for fraudulent
transactions, and acceptance in the category has increased dramatically.
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is simply no way to enforce a promise against an anonymous counter-
party. This brute fact means that someone, somewhere has to keep at
least some information about the transaction.
Retaining information needed first to process and then to verify
each individual transaction, however, necessarily makes the system
less secure. In fact, the more information one party to the transaction
feels compelled to retain, the less secure the system becomes. If a mer-
chant that has accepted a payment card retains a complete record of the
transaction -including the data on the card that was used to obtain the
authorization -its decision presents a real security risk. First off, even if
a merchant is beyond reproach, all of its employees may not be. Thus,
internal systems have to be devised, similar to those used to protect
other trade secrets, to prevent any insider from acquiring the informa-
tion for illicit purposes. More pressing than the inside threat perhaps, is
the outside one: strangers will have a significant incentive to break
down the merchant's walls ("hack the system") in order to obtain the
information and use it to engage in various forms of identity theft." If
the information is valuable enough, an inside/outside combination is
always possible. Of course, the information could also be obtained at
the original source by stick or trick. "Phishing," after all, is just a new
name for the old English crime of larceny by trick, whereby false but
suggestive questions or presentations are used to lure people to provide
information that allows the trickster to commit fraud.
The 2007 Javelin Survey confirms that securing payment card sys-
tems is a multifaceted problem. The problem begins with the source of
the information that ultimately gives rise to fraud. In 2007, Javelin
asked victims of identity theft if they knew how the information that
led to the fraud against them had been taken. Only 42 percent of con-
sumers knew the source. Of those, 75 percent reported that their in-
formation was taken directly from them with the remaining 25 percent
putting the blame on theft from a third party. Thirty-eight percent of
the consumers who knew how their information had been taken iden-
tified a lost or stolen wallet, purse, or checkbook as the source of in-
formation. "Friendly" fraud-that is, unauthorized use of data by a
friend, relative, acquaintance, or in-house employee-and traditional
retail sales were the next most reported sources, coming in at 15 per-
cent each. The various sources of cybertheft were identified much less
often, and survey responses put two personal sources of cybertheft,
25 For a vivid description of this market, see Stephen J. Dubner and Steven Levitt, Identity
Crisis, NY Times Mag 24-25 (Mar 11, 2007) (detailing the ease with which personal identity can
be obtained, often in internet chat rooms).
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theft of information from a personal computer (8 percent) and phish-
ing (4 percent), ahead of data breaches (3 percent).26
The 2007 Javelin Survey does not have much to say about the
source of stolen data. When a third party is the source of the stolen
information, consumers are unlikely to know the precise source of a
breach. Information collected by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
and analyzed by Richard J. Sullivan of the Kansas City Federal Re-
serve helps to fill in this gap. Sullivan has sorted the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse data by source of breach and then tabulated the num-
ber of incidents and the number of data records exposed. His analysis
shows that breaches occur in all segments of the economy-banks and
financial services, processors of financial information, health care, re-
tailers, education, and all levels of the government." According to his
analysis, breaches have occurred most often, almost 50 percent of the
time, in the government and education sectors, but the most records
have been stolen from retailers and processors of financial data. 9
The difficulties of securing payment card systems are com-
pounded by the ways in which thieves can combine information to
commit various types of fraud. The information that resides on a pay-
ment card is, as discussed above, inherently valuable. A reasonably
sophisticated thief can use the stolen data to create counterfeit cards
or otherwise generate fraudulent transactions. But payment card in-
formation can be combined with other information to commit more
elaborate types of fraud. Add in account data and personal identifying
information-particularly social security number and mother's
maiden name-and the thief can take over an account. By changing
an account address and redirecting statements, the thief can both cir-
cumvent certain security measures and conceal fraudulent transactions
from the true owner. A thief can also use personal information to com-
mit new account fraud-that is, open an account in another person's
name. Existing account fraud, which includes classic payment card fraud
26 2007 Javelin Survey at 30 (cited in note 17).
27 See generally Richard J. Sullivan, Risk Management and Nonbank Participation in the
US. Retail Payments System, 92(2) Economic Review 5 (2007).
28 Id at 15 table 2 (providing percentages of publicly reported data breaches across sectors
of the economy).
29 Id (reporting 19.9 percent and 22.6 percent of all breaches for retail and education
respectively and 61,288,322 and 40,691,306 records compromised for retail and processors of
financial data respectively compared with, for example, 6,352,711 records compromised for
education).
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and account takeovers, happens more frequently and generates more
total losses. New account fraud is more costly on a per event basis."
V. COMBATING THE PROBLEM ON ALL SIDES
By this point, it should be clear that there is no single solution to
combating fraud. At all times, payment card systems must keep their
eyes on many balls. In practice, reducing fraud means placing many
discrete bets while trying to preserve the attributes that make the sys-
tems relatively more attractive than paper-based forms of payment.
Efforts to combat fraud begin with the cards themselves. All of
the major card networks, taking a cue from efforts to reduce counter-
feiting of paper- and coin- based value exchange systems, have de-
signed their cards to make them more difficult to counterfeit. Holo-
grams, microprinting, and special plastics make the cards difficult to
mimic. Card systems also place data in different places on the card to
complicate potential fraud schemes. In order to use a card over the
internet, for example, a consumer must generally provide the name on
the card, the account number, the expiration date and the card secu-
rity code (the three or four digit number on the back or front of the
card that is not part of the primary account number). Although the
name, expiration date and account number are generally embossed on
the front of the card and readable from the magnetic stripe, the card
security code is only printed on the card.
Card systems have built elaborate systems to detect fraud as
cards are used. In 2005, Visa announced the launch of an advanced
authorization system, which looks at card use along two primary di-
mensions. It compares the new use of a particular card to the historic
use of that card, looking for variations that suggest possible fraud.
Variations can arise in terms of dollar volume (a low dollar transaction
followed by a series of high dollar transactions), geography (a transac-
tion at a merchant in Chicago followed immediately by a transaction in
Paris), or merchant type (a series of transactions at online merchants).
Visa's system also compares use of one card to use of other cards at or
31
about the same time, again looking for unusual usage patterns.
The systems also set rules for their participants. One key stan-
dards organization that addresses these issues is the PCI Security
30 2007 Javelin Survey at 5 (cited in note 17) (explaining that the average victim of an
existing account fraud paid $587 out of pocket in consumer costs, but if the thief opened a new
account in the victim's name, the average consumer had to pay $792).
31 See Visa Reaches Major Technology Milestones -Paves the Way for Global Growth and
Innovation, Bus Wire (Sept 27, 2006) (reprinting the VISA press release).
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Standards Council32 (PCISSC), whose mission is "to enhance payment
account security" by adopting a set of common practices across the
industry.33 The founding members of PCISSC include all the major
credit card companies (whose cooperative action in these matters
should, one hopes, be immune from examination under the antitrust
laws given the absence of any anticompetitive effects). The recom-
mended procedures involve the creation of secure networks to protect
credit card information, to test the networks so created, and to update
their design and organization in light of new information about vari-
ous technical developments and breach. The basic requirements focus
among other things on the issue identified above-retention of infor-
mation. In this case, less is really more, and a good portion of the PCI
standard is devoted to identifying the precise data that parties to
payment card transactions need to retain to enforce their contracts
and telling them what they are able to discard. Beyond that, the re-
quirements discuss the usual litany of efforts to implement system
security, including firewall separation, specialized passwords, encryp-
tion devices, virus protection, restricted access, unique person IDs, and
accessing monitoring and testing devices, all of which seem related to
the tasks at hand.
PCISSC-in part for antitrust concerns-is an umbrella group
only. It does not impose any specific sanctions on noncompliant busi-
nesses. This job falls on the payment card networks themselves. A
quick look at the various publications indicate that payment card
companies have not been indifferent to this source of loss (as well as
to other attacks, such as denial of service campaigns that could be or-
ganized by disgruntled employees). 5 The basic program comes in two
parts, the first of which requires cooperation for the particular breach.
The steps here include immediate reporting to all connected parties,
the preservation of all forms of evidence, increased alert, isolation of
compromised systems, the filing of reports, and the conduct of general
investigations. The second part includes continued demonstrations of
compliance with the overall security standards going forward, which
relates back to the PCI standards noted above. The consequence of a
32 See PCI Security Standards Council, About the PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS),
online at https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/tech/index.htm (visited Jan 12, 2008).
33 See PCISSC, PCI Security Standards Council Appoints Robert M. Russo, Sr. as General
Manager (Mar 27,2007), online at https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/03-27-07.pdf (visited
Jan 12, 2008).
34 See About the PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) (cited in note 32).
35 See, for example, Visa USA, Inc, What to Do if Comprised: Visa USA Fraud Investigations
and Incident Management Procedures 1, online at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/cisp-what-
to dojif compromised.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
2008]
The University of Chicago Law Review
breach is the imposition of fines and penalties, coupled with the possi-
ble termination of business relationships.
The punishments are not trivial in the event of noncompliance.
For example, whenever a Visa member fails to immediately notify Visa
USA Fraud Control of the suspected or confirmed loss or theft of any
Visa transaction information, Visa reserves the right to subject them
to penalties of up to $100,000 per incident. Visa may impose fines of
up to $500,000 per incident on any compromised merchant or service
provider who is not compliant at the time of the incident.36 In addition,
Visa pairs the stick with the carrot, by announcing its willingness to
reward compliant firms up to $20 million in incentives while punishing
noncompliance: "Specifically for PCI compliance, acquirers will be
fined between $5,000 and $25,000 a month for each of its Level 1 and
2 merchants who have not validated by September 30, 2007 and De-
cember 31, 2007 respectively."" In fact, Visa levied $3.4 million in fines
in 2005 and $4.6 million in 2006 for noncompliance. 3 There is also an
implicit threat of termination for noncompliance, which would be a
death knell for data processing firms and a severe blow to retail firms
that want to provide their customers with instant access to bank-
supplied credit.
VI. No SYSTEM IS PERFECTLY SECURE
The holders of confidential information play in one sense a losing
game against the hackers and phishers. In order for the overall system
to be secure each individual unit within it has to be secure. The hack-
ers and phishers will do very well indeed if they can break through the
barriers at even one key target, for the information that they acquire
there can be used, often most effectively, against other merchants. The
law of large numbers therefore guarantees that some major security
breakdowns are likely to happen, even if proper precautions are
taken-and almost sure to happen if they are not.
And so the chickens come home to roost. On December 18, 2006,
TJX Co-the world's "leading off-price retailer of apparel and home
36 Visa USA, Inc, Cardholder Information Security Program, online at http://usa.visa.com/
merchants/riskmanagement/cisp-ifscompromised.html?it=121/merchants/riskmanagement/cis_
overview.htmlllf%20Compromised (visited Jan 12,2008).
37 Visa USA, Inc, Visa USA Pledges $20 Million in Incentives to Protect Cardholder Data
(Dec 12, 2006), online at http://corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press667.jsp (visited Jan 12, 2008).
MasterCard's website only offers this cryptic warning: "If a merchant does not meet the
applicable compliance requirements of the SDP Program, then MasterCard may levy a non-
compliance assessment on the responsible MasterCard member." MasterCard Worldwide,
Compliance Considerations, online at http://www.mastercard.com/us/sdp/merchants/compliance-
considerations.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
38 Visa USA, Inc, Visa USA Pledges $20 Million (cited in note 37).
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fashions" 39-detected "suspicious software" on its computer system.
Three days later, after internal investigation, TJX learned that its com-
puter system had been breached. In mid-January 2007, TJX an-
nounced the fact of the breach to the world. In March, TJX revealed
publicly that the data breach detected during the height of the 2006
Christmas shopping was the largest known data breach in history."°
The breach apparently began in July 2005. A group of thieves,
possibly with connections to well-known groups of Romanian hackers
and Russian mafia syndicates, pulled into a parking lot outside a Mar-
shalls discount clothing store (a TJX subsidiary) in St. Paul, Minne-
sota. From the parking lot, they intercepted data that Marshalls was
transmitting across a wireless network within the store.' They used
the data to penetrate at least two nodes on the TJX network-one in
the United States and one in Europe. The Wall Street Journal con-
cluded that the theft "was as easy as breaking into a house through a
side window that was wide open."
' 2
The thieves stole a staggering amount of payment card transac-
tion data through this side window. For all transactions between De-
cember 31, 2002, and September 2, 2003, TJX had stored "all card
data" scanned from the magnetic strip on payment cards without en-
cryption.13 The payment card industry often describes such data as
"track 2" data, and with diligence the information can be used to cre-
ate counterfeit cards that contain precisely the same data, in exactly
the same form as legitimately issued cards." In 2005, thieves appar-
ently took card data for 36,200,000 cards, of which 11,200,000 were
still valid at the time of the theft. When TJX began masking the data it
stored on its system, the thieves changed their tack, using a program
called a "sniffer" to capture this information during the card authori-
zation process. As TJX's Form 10-K explains, "the technology utilized
in the Computer Intrusion during 2006 could have enabled the In-
truder to steal payment card data ... during the payment card issuer's
39 The TJX Companies, Inc, Form 10-K for the Year Ending January 27, 2007 at 2, 7
(providing a brief discussion of the company's market position and information about the
computer intrusion).
40 Joseph Pereira, Breaking the Code: How Credit-Card Data Went Out Wireless Door-In
Biggest Known Theft, Retailer's Weak Security Lost Millions of Numbers, Wall St J Al (May 4,2007).
41 Id (describing the methods and technology by which the information was intercepted).
42 Id (quoting a source identified as a "person familiar with TJX's internal probe").
43 See TJX Companies, Inc, Form 10-K at 9 (cited in note 39) (indicating that the "security
data included in the magnetic stripe on payment cards required for card present transactions
('track 2' data)" was no longer stored on the system after September 2, 2003).
44 See Larry Greenemeier, TJX Stored Customer Data, Violated Visa Payment Rules, Info
Week (Jan 29, 2007), online at http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?
articlelD=197001447 (visited Jan 12, 2008) (criticizing the length for which TJX stored its
customer data and detailing how information is intercepted).
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approval process, in which data (including the track 2 data) is trans-
mitted ... without encryption."0
The thieves found other information on the TJX system as well.
Until TJX detected the intrusion on its system, it collected and stored
personal information about customers who returned merchandise
without a receipt as well as information about at least some customers
who paid for their purchases with checks. This personal information
included "drivers' license, military and state identification numbers
(referred to as 'personal ID numbers'), together with related names
and addresses." 6 Moreover, in at least some cases, the personal ID
numbers collected by TJX "were the same as the customers' social
security numbers." 7 For transactions that took place prior to April 7,
2004, TJX held this data in unencrypted form. TJX specifically identi-
fied 451,000 customers whose personal information (as opposed to
payment card information) it had exposed to the data thieves, though
the actual number may have been far higher.
Data stolen from TJX was apparently put to use before TJX
learned of the breach. In March 2007, police in Florida arrested part
of a ring of people who had committed fraud using data previously
stolen from TJX.8 The members of the ring apparently created coun-
terfeit cards with the TJX data. They then used the counterfeit cards
to purchase stored value cards.49 The members of the ring then spent
the money stored on the stored value cards at various merchants. All
told, the members of the ring bought $8 million worth of merchandise
at various Wal-Mart stores in Florida."' Fraudulent transactions in
Georgia, Louisiana, Sweden, and Hong Kong have also been linked to
the TJX breach.5' According to at least one published report, Florida
police had told TJX in November 2006 that a gang in Florida was us-
ing information stolen from the TJX computer system to create coun-
terfeit cards.
2
45 TJX Companies, Form 10-K at 9 (cited in note 39).
46 Id at 8.
47 Id.
48 See Jaclyn Giovis, 6 Held in Credit ID Theft Case; Authorities Link S. Florida Suspects to
TJX Cos. Breach, Ft Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel 1D (Mar 24, 2007).
49 A stored value card looks like a typical general purpose payment card, but instead of
accessing a credit limit or a checking account, it accesses an electronic purse.
50 Evan Schuman, Stolen TJX Data Used in $8M Scheme before Breach Discovery,
eWeek.com (Mar 21, 2007), online at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2106149,00.asp
(visited Jan 12,2008).
51 Matt Hines, Data from TJX Security Breach Fuels Fraud Scheme, CSO (Mar 21, 2007),
online at http://www2.csoonline.comfblog-view.html?CID=32617 (visited Jan 12,2008).
52 Id.
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VII. THE AFTERMATH
The immediate question in the wake of the TJX breach is who
bears the cost. As it turns out, this is not as simple a question as it
might seem. The costs associated with a breach come in two forms-
fraud that arises from the use of the stolen data and efforts to reduce
such fraud. In the first instance, neither set of costs falls on TJX. When
payment card data is stolen from one merchant and used fraudulently
at another merchant, the fraud losses fall on either the bank that is-
sued the card or the merchant at which the stolen information was
used. The costs of efforts to mitigate such losses likewise fall on issuers
and other merchants. This initial distribution is not fixed. Each of the
major electronic payment systems administers a dispute resolution
process that redistributes the costs associated with a breach of the sort
experienced by TJX. Although one would expect participants in these
systems to settle on the optimal distribution of cost, the matter has not
been left to private contract.
Some efforts to redistribute losses have been foreclosed by fed-
eral law. As we noted earlier, the 2007 Javelin Survey identifies lost or
stolen cards and "friendly" fraud as the first and second most common
sources of stolen information. Although the individual losses from
such events are small when compared with a large system breach, in
the aggregate, such losses add up. One might think then that issuers
and systems would put some of the onus for fighting fraud on con-
sumers. If a consumer were subject to the risk for potential losses aris-
ing from unauthorized use of a stolen card, one would expect the con-
sumer to raise the issue with the issuing financial institution rather
promptly. At present, however, federal law limits the liability of credit
card holders to $50 per card, no questions asked. We see no reason
even for this (modest) restriction on freedom of contract. If payment
card companies think larger penalties are appropriate and disclose
such penalties to consumers, the losses should not be socialized as a
matter of law.
As it turns out, the federal standard has relatively little bite. Mar-
ket pressures have pushed the balance still further, insulating payment
card users from essentially all fraud losses. Visa, for example, adver-
tises a "zero liability" policy on its website.M We think that two rein-
forcing trends explain this result. First, the customer whose card is
stolen suffers even if he pays nothing in cash, if only from the major
inconvenience of the disruption of service which could (if the losses
53 15 USC § 1643(a)(1)(B) (2000).
54 See Visa USA, Inc, Visa Security Program, online at http://usa.visa.com/personalV
security/visa-security-program/zero-liability.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
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persist) lead to a refusal to maintain the account. Therefore, no indi-
vidual liability should not be confused with no individual loss. Second,
the improved systems of detection, plus the background level of cus-
tomer cooperation (even in the absence of liability), are sufficient to
explain the strong market trend away from any form of customer li-
ability (which should give some pause to those who think that preemp-
tive consumer protection laws "improve" upon market outcomes).
Consumers are not the only participants who object to bearing a
share of the costs associated with system security. Other parties have
also looked for relief outside the system. Just three months after the
TJX breach became public, several small financial institutions, joined
by a handful of associations of such institutions, filed a class action
lawsuit against TJX in the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts. They claimed that TJX had violated state and fed-
eral laws relating to negligent misrepresentation, unfair and deceptive
acts, and negligence in the retention and control of these databases in
addition to breach of contract claims." The relief sought included
compensation for the reissued cards and all fraudulent transactions
traced to the breach." The complaint is drafted under the rules of no-
tice pleading so it gives little indication of how the various causes of
action interact with each other, and we are inclined to think that vir-
tually all the counts here are duplicative of the breach of contract ac-
tion. Thus count one, dealing with negligent misrepresentation, only
asserts that the defendant "falsely represented that it would comply
with" the various Card Operating Regulations, which adds little to the
point that they did not so comply.57 The use of the ostensible tort ac-
tion is probably meant to operate as an end run on limitations on
damages in the contract claim, and we see no reason why it should be
the source of any additional relief.
In this regard, the litigation in the wake of the TJX breach has
followed the path of litigation in the wake of previous security
breaches. After the discovery of the breach at BJ's Wholesale Club, a
number of financial institutions filed claims for fraud losses and reis-
suance costs.m They alleged contract, tort, and consumer protection
claims against BJ's and its merchant bank, Fifth Third. The district
court dismissed all the contract claims except the contract claim
55 Class Action Complaint, In re TJX Companies Retail Security Breach Litigation, No 07-
10162 3 (D Mass filed Apr 25,2007).
56 Id 1 72-74.
57 Id 81.
58 See, for example, Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union v Fifth Third Bank, 398 F
Supp 2d 317,322-23 (MD Pa 2005).
[75:203
Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry
against Fifth Third" and concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a
claim against Fifth Third as third-party beneficiaries of the contract-
the Operating Regulations-between Visa and Fifth Third.6 It dis-
missed a parallel claim against BJ's, noting that the plaintiffs had not
(and could not) allege a direct contractual relationship between Visa
and BJ's and that the contract between Fifth Third and BJ's specifically
disclaimed any obligation to third parties. Ultimately, the third-party
beneficiary claim against Visa failed because Visa intended its rules to
benefit the system as a whole as opposed to any specific issuer.'
Financial institutions have had considerably more success shifting
costs through state legislatures. In the immediate wake of the TJX
breach, Minnesota adopted a law that prohibits merchants accepting
card payment from retaining certain information. Like the PCI stan-
dard, the Minnesota law forbids merchants from retaining the contents
of the magnetic stripe. Minnesota law also makes a merchant respon-
sible for whomever it hires to process payment card transactions, imput-
ing to the merchant the service provider's retention of information. The
kicker comes in the assessment of damages: parties (read: merchants)
that violate the Act are held, in essence, fully liable for all consequential
damages sustained by banks in canceling or reissuing credit cards, clos-
ing accounts or otherwise managing their usual business, and any re-
fund or credit that must be issued to a bank customer.
We do not profess to have any divine knowledge as to whether
these various transfer payments from retailers to banks make good
sense as a matter of policy. But we are equally confident that the Min-
nesota legislature has no better information on this point than we
have. Minnesota's response to the TJX breach suffers from several
obvious problems:
0 First, payment cards operate on national networks, which suggests
the need for a uniform, presumably federal, rule for all financial
institutions and merchants. Fifty different state regimes will cre-
ate havoc for merchants, networks, financial institutions, and, ul-
timately, consumers.
59 Id at 338.
60 Id at 332-37.
61 See Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union v Fifth Third Bank, 2006 WL 1724574,
*1 (MD Pa) (memorandum opinion). See also Cumis Insurance Society, Inc v BJ's Wholesale
Club, Inc, Civil Action No 05-1158, *2 (Mass Super Ct filed Dec 1, 2005) (memorandum opinion)
(rejecting a similar claim in Massachusetts).
62 See Act of May 21, 2007, 2007 Minn Laws 108, to be codified at Minn Stat Ann
§ 325E.64 (West 2007) (mandating a forty-eight hour limit on the retention of personal
information following a transaction).
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* Second, however sensible the liability standard seems today, it
will quickly become outdated. As noted above, payment card sys-
tems and fraudsters are engaged in a constant struggle, and fraud
prevention efforts that seem state of the art today (for example,
imposing a forty-eight hour limit on retention of card data) will
very quickly become outmoded.
* Third, the statute fails to recognize how its liability and damage
provisions relate to all of the other provisions of the elaborate
contracts that currently bind participants in the payment card
networks. In particular, the statute completely fails to recognize
the fact that the shift in the liability rules may increase the costs
of payment card acceptance to merchants to the point that they
either drop out of the systems entirely or demand some reduction
in the fees that they pay.
* Fourth, the statute awards unliquidated damages to injured finan-
cial institutions. We recognize that modern rules of damages typi-
cally award unliquidated damages even in commercial disputes.
Nevertheless, we note that nearly all well-drawn commercial
agreements rule out consequential damages determined on a
case-by-case basis in favor of a liquidated damages standard.
In sum, the new legislation will add a new layer of cost and uncer-
tainty to the payment card system. The new statute appears to favor
card issuers over retailers and processors. But in the long run, that
state of affairs cannot last. Merchants do not, after all, have to accept
payment cards sponsored by Visa and MasterCard in order to stay in
business. Although payment cards offer many advantages over other
forms of payment, particularly cash and checks, there are limits to the
price that merchants will pay and the risks that they are willing to
bear. Legislation of the sort adopted in Minnesota may have the effect
of pushing merchants to adopt other forms of payment that do not
pose some of the risks presented by payment cards. This legislation is
likely to introduce serious distortions, first because of its high adminis-
trative costs, and second because of its unintended incentives on the
relevant parties.
To say so does not deny public authorities a role in combating
payment fraud on payment card networks. By imposing criminal sanc-
tions on data thieves and investing resources in efforts to prosecute
theft of payment card data, public authorities no doubt reduce the
total amount of fraud. However, this role does not extend to preempt-
ing efforts on the part of private actors to distribute losses that arise
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from such breach. Unfortunately, the leap from step one to step two is
all too frequent. Perhaps the most prominent recent instance of this
cycle is the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 6 in response to the
corporate scandals that took place at Enron, WorldCom, and the like.
The mistake that doomed the governmental response is operative in
this case: the deep legislative conviction that they know more about
the optimal contracting strategies for risk allocation than the immedi-
ate, and sophisticated, parties to the transaction. In Sarbanes-Oxley,
this worldview led to stringent conditions on independent directors
and auditing requirements, which encumber well-run firms as well as
poorly run ones.' The upshot is a change in corporate culture, a loss of
initial public offerings to Europe and Asia, and a robust "going pri-
vate" movement. We do not think that efforts to legislate responses to
credit card fraud are likely to have the dramatic consequences of Sar-
banes-Oxley, but not for want of trying.
63 Pub L No 107-204,116 Stat 745 (Supp 2002).
64 Michael Bloomberg and Charles Schumer, Sustaining New York's and the US' Global
Financial Services Leadership 19-20, online at http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/
pressroom/special-reports/2007/NYREPORT%20_FINAL.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008). See
generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 Yale L J 1521 (2005) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley represents a change in
regulation regimes, moving from disclosure requirements to substantive corporate governance
mandates and arguing that the change resulted from hasty decisionmaking, not careful legislative
deliberation).
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